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ABSTRACT 
 The U.S. military does not possess the technological superiority gap it once 
enjoyed in the past. Thus, the problem this paper will address is how to improve the 
combat effectiveness of the U.S. Army, asking whether it is properly organized and 
equipped to survive in a future near-peer conflict environment. Given that the infantry 
rifle squad is the basic building block of the Army, infantry squad organization is the 
focus of this study.  This paper argues that given the characteristics of the near-future 
operating environment, future research must design a balanced and more robust infantry 
squad organization that can effectively operate within the electromagnetic spectrum. This 
cross-domain capability will be critical to the survivability and lethality of the infantry 
squads of the future. 
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Since the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military has trained and 
equipped to fight in irregular wars where both the air and sea domains were uncontested, 
and adversaries have not possessed large, advanced armies. However, potential near-peer 
enemies have significantly different tactics, techniques, and technological capabilities. The 
U.S. military does not possess the degree of technological superiority it once enjoyed. 
Thus, the problem that this paper will address is how to improve the combat effectiveness 
of the U.S. Army, asking whether it is properly organized and equipped to survive in a 
future near-peer conflict environment. Given that the infantry rifle squad is the basic 
building block of the Army, the infantry squad organization is the focus of this study.   
This paper argues that, given the characteristics of the near-future operating 
environment, future research must design a balanced and more robust infantry squad 
organization that can effectively operate within the electromagnetic spectrum. Enemy 
unmanned aerial reconnaissance platforms and electromagnetic tracking systems capable 
of locating and directing enemy artillery assets on friendly positions pose a significant 
threat to the infantry soldier. In addition, given the increased likelihood of operating in 
urban environments, which require more manpower and often result in greater casualties, 
it is imperative that the U.S. Army avoid the next near-peer conflict with the current nine-
soldier squad organization, which is vulnerable to the effects of attrition. Equipping the 
infantry squad with the capability to jam enemy radio frequencies, disrupt enemy drone 
navigation and communication systems, geo-locate enemy signals, execute electronic 
deception, and map out the electromagnetic spectrum for actionable intelligence will all be 
critical for future engagements. Future research must determine how to incorporate these 
cross-domain capabilities at the lowest tactical level in order to increase unit independence, 
lethality, and survivability. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. THE PROBLEM 
The period in which the U.S. military has enjoyed freedom of action in both the sea 
and air domains may end. Future combat against near-peer adversaries will not allow such 
luxuries. The United States’ effective use of precision munitions, night vision optics, 
satellite navigation and other innovative combat systems demonstrated to the world a new 
and evolved way of fighting. Consequently, Russia and China, the two strongest U.S. near-
peer competitors, have downsized their older unit formations and modernized their forces 
to better confront this modern style of warfare.1  Therefore, since 1991, our near-peer 
adversaries have changed significantly from their Cold War-era formations. This change 
in Russian and Chinese capabilities has significant implications for the U.S. military on the 
future battlefield. 
In the 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, the 
President of the United States highlights the military’s global shift from a counter-terrorism 
focus to a “great powers” focus.2  The government’s decision to shift from the decades-old 
counter-terrorism focus requires new changes to how the U.S. military is organized, 
trained, and equipped. In 2016, David E. Johnson, a principal researcher at the RAND 
Corporation, stated, “Because of the recent and current focus on irregular operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, we are unprepared to deal with state-sponsored hybrid and state 
operations that fall at the other end of the spectrum of operations.”3 
                                                 
1 Anthony Cordesman and Joseph Kendall, Chinese Strategy and Military Modernization in 2016: A 
Comparative Analysis (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2016),  
https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/161208_Chinese_Strategy_Military_ 
Modernization_2016.pdf; Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles, The Russian Way of War: Force 
Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces (Fort Leavenworth Kansas: Foreign 
Military Studies Office, 2016). 
2 Donald Trump, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (The White House, 
December 2017), 2–3. 
3 David E. Johnson, “The Challenges of the ‘Now’ and Their Implications for the U.S. Army,” RAND 
Corporation, 2016, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE184.html. 
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Since the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military has trained and 
equipped to fight in irregular wars where both the air and sea domains were uncontested, 
and adversaries have not possessed large, advanced armies. However, potential near-peer 
enemies have significantly different tactics, techniques, and technological capabilities. 
Contemporary assessments have shown that the U.S.’s near-peer adversaries possess equal 
or even superior capabilities, in varying military domains.4 Consequently, the U.S. military 
may not possess the technological superiority gap it once enjoyed in the past. Thus, the 
problem that this study will address is how to improve the combat effectiveness of the U.S. 
Army, asking whether it is properly organized and equipped to survive in a future near-
peer conflict environment. Given that the infantry rifle squad is the basic building block of 
the Army, the infantry squad is the focus of this study. This paper will evaluate historical 
studies conducted in inter-war transition periods in order to draw upon not only their 
conclusions but also the logic from which they based their new designs. This historical 
analysis may provide future research with valuable insight from which to derive the next 
infantry squad organization, given the near-peer threats we face today. 
This study argues that, given the characteristics of the near-future operating 
environment, future research must design a balanced and more robust infantry squad 
organization that can operate effectively within the electromagnetic spectrum. Given the 
increased likelihood of operating in urban environments, which require more manpower 
and often result in greater casualties, it is imperative that the U.S. Army avoid the next 
near-peer conflict with the current nine-soldier squad organization, which is vulnerable to 
the effects of attrition. 
Additionally, enemy unmanned aerial reconnaissance platforms and 
electromagnetic tracking systems capable of locating and directing enemy artillery assets 
on friendly positions pose a significant threat to the infantry soldier. Equipping the infantry 
squad with the capability to jam enemy radio frequencies, disrupt enemy drone navigation 
and communication systems, geo-locate enemy signals, execute electronic deception, and 
                                                 
4 Sydney J. Freedberg, “Army Cyber Accelerates; Electronic Warfare Lags,” Breaking Defense, 
February 10, 2017, https://breakingdefense.com/2017/02/army-cyber-accelerates-electronic-warfare-lags/. 
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map out the electromagnetic spectrum for actionable intelligence will be critical for future 
engagements. Therefore, future research should determine how to incorporate these cross-
domain capabilities at the lowest tactical level in order to increase unit lethality and 
survivability.   
B. AN ARMY IN TRANSITION  
Since the conclusion of major combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. 
military has entered a period of transition as it prepares for the next conflict. Military and 
academic experts have thoroughly studied interwar transition periods to understand why 
some nations succeed and others fail at modernization. In their edited book Military 
Innovation in the Interwar Period, Williamson Murray and Allan Millett gathered scholars 
to study the key factors that helped or hindered the innovation conducted in the interwar 
period between WWI and WWII. Murray and Millett’s purpose was “to provide insights 
into the nature of the processes involved in major innovation” and organizational change.5   
These authors investigated seven studies of military development. These case studies 
include armored warfare, submarine warfare, carrier aviation, strategic bombing, tactical 
bombing, amphibious warfare, and radar development.6  Murray and Millett found that 
“sheer technical innovation, as the Germans proved, does not win wars. Instead, the 
interaction of technical change and organizational adaptation within realistic strategic 
assessment determines whether good ideas turn into real military capabilities.”7  Murray 
and Millett found that to maximize the combat effectiveness of new technology, the U.S. 
military would not only need to design new organizational structures, tactics, and doctrine 
around the new technology, but thoroughly train the soldiers to the new way of fighting.8   
Murray and Millett also determined that a key factor in modernization was to understand 
the future security environment because it helped to discern how future wars would differ 
                                                 
5 Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Pr, 1996), 3. 
6 Murray and Millett, 3. 
7 Murray and Millett, 368. 
8 Murray and Millett, 372. 
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from previous wars due to changes in technology and weapons.9  Thus, according to 
Murray and Millett, to modernize in this interwar period, the U.S. must first understand the 
future operating environment, develop new innovative designs that are optimal to that 
environment, and then train accordingly. 
However, understanding the future operating environment is not necessarily easy. 
Some might believe that we are always doomed to fight the next war as we fought the last 
war. In his book Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military, Stephen 
Rosen studies organizations that successfully modernized or failed to modernize their 
military. Rosen’s study focuses on understanding the underlying causes that made these 
organizations successful. Rosen structures his research by comparing and contrasting 
various British and American organizations engaged in similar innovative research. Rosen 
then analyzes why one organization succeeded and the other did not. Rosen finds that 
interwar innovation or “peacetime innovation” drives “how military communities evaluate 
the future character of war, and how they effect change in the senior officer corps.”10   
Thus, like Murray and Millett, Rosen believes that a key factor in understanding how 
technology will change the nature of warfare is by having a good understanding of the 
future operating environment. 
In a contemporary society where technology has become increasingly specialized, 
professional military education and specialization will have a greater importance in the 
modernization process. Given the complexities of modern technology, professional 
military education is critical to improving soldier’s survivability and lethality on the 
battlefield. In the book Preparing for War: The Emergence of the Modern U.S. Army, 
1815–1917, J.P Clark found that given the influences of contemporary society, the U.S. 
Army of the 1800’s prepared for war differently than the U.S. Army of the Twentieth 
Century, which relied less on an individual’s natural leadership abilities and more on 
                                                 
9 Murray and Millett, 406. 
10 Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the next War: Innovation and the Modern Military, Cornell Studies in 
Security Affairs (Ithaca, NY London: Cornell University Press, 1994), 52. 
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professional military education.11  Therefore, given the complexities of modern 
technology, civilian and military education programs that develop soldiers understanding 
of modern systems is becoming more important. For example, a leader who better 
understands the technicalities of the electromagnetic spectrum will better know how to 
leverage it in combat. 
Interwar transition periods are not new the U.S. military. Following Vietnam, the 
U.S. military found itself in a similar situation as it finds itself today. In the book Forging 
the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army, Benjamin Jensen, like the authors above, 
studied how the U.S. military innovated during interwar periods. In his book Jensen 
illustrates how General William E. Depuy, a World War II and Vietnam veteran, led the 
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in the development of the new 
“Active Defense” doctrine.12  Like today, the U.S. military needed to redesigning the U.S. 
military to fight the Soviet Union after the military had spent nearly two decades 
conducting irregular warfare in Vietnam.13   General Depuy used the contemporary 1967 
Arab-Israeli conflict as a foundation from which to envision how the Soviet Union would 
fight in Europe.14  Jensen illustrates General Depuy’s developmental process in the 
following sequence: first, threat analysis, then concept development, and lastly doctrinal 
development.15  Jensen found that using this developmental model, General Depuy 
successfully developed a new organizational and doctrinal concept from which the defense 
community could reimagine future warfare.16   Jensen found that although organizational 
hierarchy and bureaucracy historically restrict innovation, he found that “incubators” 
                                                 
11 J. P. Clark, Preparing for War: The Emergence of the Modern U.S. Army, 1815–1917 (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2017), 1–9. 
12 Benjamin M. Jensen, Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army (Stanford, California: 
Stanford Security Studies, an imprint of Stanford University Press, 2016), 25. 
13 Jensen, 25. 
14 Jensen, 35. 
15 Jensen, 34–35. 
16 Jensen, 53–55. 
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outside the hierarchy and the “advocacy networks” successfully moved innovation 
forward.17   
Perhaps it is time for the U.S. military to fundamentally reanalyze itself as it had 
following Vietnam. Jensen’s ideational framework (Threat  Analysis  Concept  
Doctrine) provides a clear sequential path for future research to follow.18   Like General 
Depuy, this study will analyze the future operating environment and the near-peer threats 
the infantry rifle squad will likely encounter on the future battlefield. This paper will also 
analyze the major U.S. Army studies on the infantry squad organization that were 
conducted during other interwar periods in order to draw out the key factors that influenced 
the squad’s organizational change. With a general understanding of the future operating 
environment, future research can better develop new infantry concepts. 
Rosen, Clark, Murray & Millett found that understanding the future nature of 
warfare to be an important factor in the interwar developmental process. However, 
understanding the past can also be beneficial to the developmental modernization process. 
In “Enhancing Combat Effectiveness, The Evolution of The United States Army Infantry 
Rifle Squad Since The End Of World War II,” Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Timothy M. 
Karcher states, “Typically, the Army would need to conduct costly studies and research to 
determine optimum unit organizations, but, fortunately, past studies provide potential 
conclusions, which are still relevant today.”19  Karcher notes that during these types of 
transition periods scholars and military leaders have often resorted to costly studies in order 
to determine the next new innovative ideas for the future. More importantly, Karcher found 
that many of the past infantry studies are still applicable to today. Leveraging the historical 
conclusions and rationale of the past can help save time, money, and resources in 
determining the organizations of the future. Therefore, like Karcher’s study, this study will 
also analyze historical research to find relevant conclusions for determining the most 
                                                 
17 Benjamin M. Jensen, Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army (Stanford, California: 
Stanford Security Studies, an imprint of Stanford University Press, 2016), 1–2. 
18 Jensen, 35. 
19 Timothy Karcher, “Enhancing Combat Effectiveness, The Evolution Of The United States Army 
Infantry Rifle Squad Since The End Of World War II” (Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff 
College, 2002), 4. 
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combat-effective infantry squad organization that will operate in the near future. Karcher 
states that using this historical analysis methodology “allows for the observation of the 
evolution of the rifle squad from the end of World War II to the present, aiding the reader 
in determining the rationale for various changes.”20 Therefore, in addition to finding 
valuable historical conclusions, using the historical analysis method helps one to gain a 
clear picture of the systematic factors that drive the infantry organization to change over 
time. With this information, one can apply the historical lessons learned to the development 
of a new infantry squad organization using the contemporary operating environment as the 
new foundation from which to base the new organizational design.  
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
This research matters to the U.S. Army, given the vulnerabilities that exist in our 
current infantry formations. Today’s infantry rifle squad faces significant challenges for 
surviving on the future battlefield. Given the increasing importance of light dismounted 
ground units capable of securing urban environments and other restrictive terrain, the 
survivability of the light infantryman will be critical to the future of the U.S. In order for 
the future infantry rifle squad to succeed, it must evolve to the enemy and the operating 
environment it will confront.   
My thesis will show that the current U.S. infantry rifle squad has multiple 
vulnerabilities, which, if exploited by a capable near-peer, could prove deadly.   Current 
infantry organizations Command and Control (C2) systems are heavily reliant on the 
Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS).21  The EMS links the vast multi-layered network that 
provides the infantry squad with critical external support. Denying these communications 
systems could significantly degrade the infantry squad’s ability to coordinate critical 
support functions such as supporting fires or logistical support missions.   
Additionally, each infantry soldier wears multiple pieces of equipment that emit 
one (or in some cases multiple) electromagnetic signals. When active these signals are a 
                                                 
20 Karcher, 14. 
21 Russian New Generation Warfare Handbook (Fort Meade, MD: Asymmetric Warfare Group, 2016), 
17. 
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vulnerability because they reveal friendly unit locations and make the emitting soldier a 
target to enemy kinetic attack. To the naked eye, a soldier may be invisible when wearing 
the proper camouflage and concealed behind vegetation. However, looking through the 
‘eyes’ of the EMS, the same soldier can be easily found. Such vulnerabilities have not been 
an issue in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, in a future near-peer conflict 
environment these common vulnerabilities are significant.  
In the book Learning to Forget: U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine and 
Practice from Vietnam to Iraq, David Fitzgerald argues that military leaders can draw on 
lessons from the past in order to serve the needs of the present.22  Fitzgerald states, “Major 
innovation and change can be driven from within military organizations but that such 
changes tend to be in reaction to major traumatic events.”23  As the Army enters this new 
transition period, it either can address the vulnerabilities before the next conflict or be 
forced to address the issues after experiencing significant loss on the battlefield.    
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter II will begin with an analysis of past U.S. Army studies that have had a 
significant impact on the infantry squad’s organization. The historical studies examined 
will include the 1946 Infantry Conference, the 1956 Research Study of Infantry Rifle 
Squad TOE (ASIRS), the 1961 Optimum Composition of the Rifle Squad and Platoon 
(OCRSP) study, and the 1970s Infantry Rifle Unit Study (IRUS). This chapter will also 
compare and contrast the conclusions of other contemporary research papers that have used 
this same historical methodology. The purpose of this historical examination is to analyze 
the past methodologies utilized and to highlight any relevant conclusions that may be 
applicable to the future.   
Chapter III will analyze the contemporary operating environment and determine 
how it will influence the creation of the future infantry squad organization. This chapter 
will focus on the key variables of the contemporary operating environment that will most 
                                                 
22 David Fitzgerald, Learning to Forget: U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice from 
Vietnam to Iraq (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2013), 203–211. 
23 Fitzgerald, 206. 
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influence the future infantry squad organization. It will also discuss the implications of a 
battlefield proliferated with sensors and the growing use of the information domain to 
include the EMS. Next, the chapter will analyze the most likely contemporary threats that 
will be confronted in the near future and discuss the implications to the infantry rifle squad.  
Chapter IV will conclude with key factors for future research to consider in the 
improvement of the infantry rifle squad. With clear developmental logic derived from past 
studies and a clearly defined future operating environment, this chapter will bring all this 
information together in order to provide insight into a more combat effective infantry rifle 
squad for the future. This chapter will highlight the key characteristics of the future 
operating environment and synthesize their effects on the factors of control, lethality, 
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II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, the study will analyze the methodologies and conclusions of five 
key historical infantry studies and five contemporary studies conducted between 1935 and 
the present day. The purpose of this historical examination is to highlight any relevant 
conclusions that may be applicable to today. This historical analysis will examine the logic 
and criteria that the Army used to maximize the squad’s combat effectiveness. These 
findings will aid in the development of the future infantry squad organization. This chapter 
will also compare and contrast the conclusions of other contemporary studies that have 
recommended changes to the infantry squad organization. 
A. DEFINING THE INFANTRY RIFLE SQUAD 
We must first define the infantry rifle squad:  According to the new Army 
Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-21.10 published in May 2018, an infantry rifle company 
consists of a company headquarters section, a mortar section, three rifle platoons, and a 
Raven unmanned system (UAS) team (see Figure 1). In an infantry company, the rifle 
platoons are the primary maneuver elements with the greatest amount of firepower. Each 
infantry rifle platoon within the rifle company consists of a platoon headquarters section, 
three infantry rifle squads, and one weapon squad. In an infantry platoon, the infantry rifle 
squads are the primary maneuver elements. The weapons squad is a supporting element 
that provides supporting fires to the maneuver squads. The weapons squad of an infantry 
platoon consists of two machine gun teams and two anti-tank teams. The three infantry 
rifle squads of an infantry platoon each contain two infantry fire teams. The infantry fire 
team is the smallest unit of organization within the Infantry rifle squad. Each fire team 
consists of a team leader armed with an M4 carbine, one automatic rifleman equipped with 
an M249 squad automatic weapon, one grenadier equipped with an M4 and M203 (or 
M320) grenade launcher, and a rifleman armed with an M4. Given their small size, limited 
12 
firepower, and other factors, the current fire team organizations are incapable of 
maneuvering independently.24    
 
Figure 1. Infantry Rifle Company Organization.25 
B. THE BUILDING BLOCK OF THE STUDY 
The infantry rifle squad is the basic build block of platoons, companies, and 
battalions. Karcher states in his study that, “One must determine what one wants this 
organization and its subordinate units to do, and its optimum organization. Starting at the 
bottom, and working the way to the top, the infantry rifle squad becomes the focus of this 
                                                 
24 Army Techniques, Publication No. 3–21.10 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2018), 1–
14. 
25 Source: The Infantry Rifle Company, FM 3–21.10 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 
2006), 1–11. 
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study.”26  As similar studies, this analysis will focus on the infantry rifle squad 
organization. Although the fire team is a smaller element in the squad organization, because 
of its small size and inability to maneuver, this study will not begin at the infantry fire team 
level.  
The infantry rifle company’s mission statement is the guiding framework from 
which to base the new organizational design. Any conclusion or recommendation that falls 
outside of the doctrinal mission statement is not suitable option. Additionally, if the mission 
statement regularly changes it will make any new recommendation less valuable given the 
uncertainty of the future. ATP 3-21.10 states (emphasis added): 
The mission of the infantry rifle company is to close with the Enemy 
using fire and movement to destroy or capture enemy forces or to repel 
enemy attacks by fire, close combat, and counter-attacks to control 
land areas, including populations and resources. The infantry rifle 
company Commander exercises Mission command, directs the operation of 
the company, and attaches units while conducting decisive action 
throughout the depth of the company’s area of operations. Company 
missions, although non-inclusive, may include reducing fortified areas, 
infiltrating and seizing objectives in the enemy’s rear, eliminating enemy 
forces remnants in restricted terrain, securing key facilities and activities, 
and conducting operations in support of stability tasks in the wake of 
maneuvering forces. Reconnaissance and surveillance tasks and security 
operations remain a core competency of the infantry rifle company, platoon, 
and squad.27  
ATP 3-21.10 states that the infantry rifle company’s mission is to close with the 
enemy in close combat and destroy him using fire and maneuver. One unique capability 
mentioned in this mission statement is the capability to operate in restricted terrain. This 
movement capability is unique to the infantry given the inability of other mounted units to 
traverse dense foliage, rough mountains, or destroyed cities. Therefore, retaining this 
capability along with others that differentiate the infantry from other maneuver units is 
critical in developing future organizational designs.  
                                                 
26 Karcher, “Enhancing Combat Effectiveness, The Evolution Of The United States Army Infantry 
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27 ATP 3–21.10, 1–13. 
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By comparing the 2018 mission statement with an old 1962 infantry company 
mission statement we can assess how much the infantry company’s mission has changed 
over time. The old 1962 Infantry Field Manual (FM 7–10) states that “the mission of the 
rifle company is to close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver in order to destroy 
or capture him or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack.”28  By 
comparing the 2018 mission statement with the 1962 version we see that the infantry 
company and infantry squad’s mission has remained nearly identical over the last fifty 
years. With this knowledge, we can infer that the infantry squad’s mission statement will 
continue to remain constant in the near future and thus provide a better foundation in 
developing a future design.   
C. SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Although this research may also be relevant to other infantry models, this analysis 
will solely focus on the organization of the U.S. Army infantry rifle squad (light) assigned 
to an Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT). Mechanized infantry organizations such as 
the Stryker infantry or the heavy Bradley Fighting Vehicle infantry organizations are 
beyond the scope of this study. This same limitation includes specialized infantry squads 
such as those that operate in the elite Ranger Battalions.   
Additionally, given the uncertainty of the far-future operating environment (beyond 
20 years), this study will focus on the near-term operating environment (within 20 years) 
to avoid being bogged down in speculation of the ambiguous future. By using these time 
parameters, we assume that the near future technology will not change significantly and 
that the infantry rifle squad will use similar weapon systems that produce the equivalent 
amount of firepower as the systems of today. Using these assumptions will allow us to 
develop useful recommendations for the future. Additionally, this study will assume that 
there will be no substantial troop drawdown requirements within the next 15 years. Such 
drawdowns would limit the Army’s willingness to grow an infantry organization and 
therefore limit our range of recommended options. 
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D. DEFINING COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS 
Next, one must define what it means to be combat effective. To assess combat 
effectiveness, there must be defined criteria from which to assess the strengths and 
weaknesses of an organization. This study will utilize four commonly used criteria from 
previous studies in order to assess the combat effectiveness of different infantry squad 
organizations. These four criteria are control, lethality, sustainability, and flexibility. 
This study defines ‘control’ as the ease of a leader to manage his or her 
organization. Thus, the more people under a leader’s supervision the less the leader is able 
to effectively control that organizational unit. This aspect of control plays a critical part in 
balancing the organization’s leadership structure and its leader-to-led ratio (or the ratio of 
a leader to direct subordinate soldiers). 
Next, this study defines ‘sustainability’ as the ability of a unit to be inflicted with 
casualties (attrition) and loss of equipment and still be capable of accomplishing its core 
tasks (maneuver, attack, & defend). Dupree and Homesly define sustainability as “the 
ability of the squad or team to function as a fighting unit despite normal attrition.”29   The 
more soldiers a squad has, the more attrition the squad is able to sustain and still be capable 
of closing with and destroying an enemy through fire and maneuver.   
‘Flexibility’ is the ability of a unit to conduct multiple tasks or the “ability to 
perform a variety of missions.”30   As noted previously, an infantry squad has a wide range 
of missions that include attack, defense, reconnaissance, and other operations in support of 
stability tasks. A flexible organizational structure would allow the infantry squad to not 
only conduct its primary core tasks of fire and maneuver, but also all the other tasks that 
fall within its mission statement.    
Finally, the study defines ‘lethality’ as a squad’s ability to inflict damage on an 
enemy with the use of firepower. The infantry squad’s organic weapons and other enabling 
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equipment generate squad firepower. As the number of weapon systems increase within a 
unit, the unit’s overall firepower simultaneously increases. Similarly, an increase in the 
rate of fire (or destructive power) of an individual weapon system will simultaneously 
increase the lethality of the unit as a whole. 
 Now the framework of the study is established, this paper will analyze the 
methodologies and conclusions of historical infantry studies conducted between 1935 and 
the present day to highlight any relevant conclusions that may be applicable to today. Using 
these four variables, this historical analysis will examine the logic and criteria that the 
Army used to maximize the squad’s combat effectiveness, then compare and contrast their 
conclusions to aid in the development of the future infantry squad organization. 
E. 1946 INFANTRY CONFERENCE 
After WWII the U.S. Army conducted the 1946 Infantry Conference held at Fort 
Benning, GA to improve the infantry’s organizational structure used during the war (see 
Figure 2). The conference captured the combat experience of veteran soldiers from both 
the European and the Asian theaters of operation. Using their valuable insights, the Infantry 
Conference’s attendees analyzed the strengths and weaknesses in the infantry 
organizational structure and made new innovative changes using a committee voting 
process. Although the conference had many areas of focus, one key area of study was the 
combat effectiveness and organization of the infantry rifle squad. The question posed to 
the committee was if the infantry squad organization was satisfactory or not, and if not, 
then what changes would make the organization better.31  
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Figure 2. WWII Infantry Rifle Squad.32 
During WWII, the infantry rifle squad organization consisted of 12 soldiers: a squad 
leader, assistance squad leader, two scouts, one automatic rifleman (equipped with a BAR), 
one assistant gunner, one ammo bearer, and five riflemen.33   Unlike today, the WWII 
infantry squad organization did not fire and maneuver independently as per its design. 
During this time, the infantry platoon was the lowest echelon capable of fire and maneuver. 
The infantry squad would move as a single entity and suppress the enemy while another 
squad maneuvered or assaulted the enemy while being covered by another squad in the 
platoon. In theory, the squad leader would travel forward with the scout element to find the 
enemy. Upon finding the enemy, the squad leader would direct the suppression of the 
enemy with the squad automatic rifleman, which would enable another squad to assault the 
enemy position.34   However, the committee found that this was often not the case and that 
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the squad leader often became pinned down in front of his squad where he could not 
effectively control the other soldiers.35 
After an extensive review, the committee came to three key conclusions: First, the 
committee found that the 12-soldier infantry squad was too large for one soldier to control 
(even with an assistant squad leader). During this time, the primary methods of control at 
the squad level revolved around the use of voice commands and hand and arm signals. 
Each of these control methods is limited in reach making it difficult to control eleven other 
dispersed soldiers even in favorable conditions. Another part of the problem of control was 
the inexperience of the squad leaders. General Omar Bradley stated in his testimonial, “I 
am sure that the squad is too large. With rapid promotion due to casualties you sometimes 
find yourself with people commanding squads who are having a pretty hard job 
commanding that large a squad.”36   General Bradley’s comments highlight that a part of 
the issue of control was the inexperience of the conscripted junior leadership who often led 
squads due to the high level of attrition. Therefore, the conference determined that “one 
man can normally control no more than eight others by voice and hand signals in the 
field.”37   
Second, the committee concluded that the infantry squad should anticipate 
operating at 25 percent below the authorized unit strength.38  The conference found that 
attrition was common in warfare and that squads often had to operate well below their 
authorized strength. Although the committee did not determine the minimum number of 
soldiers needed to operate effectively, it was determined that the squad should not be larger 
than nine soldiers.39   According to the committee’s findings, a nine-man squad would be 
able to sustain a small number of casualties (one or two soldiers) and still be able to 
suppress or assault the enemy but not maneuver independently. 
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Third, the committee found that the WWII squad did not possess sufficient 
firepower in comparison to their German counterpart.    The analysis found that the German 
Light Machine Gun (LMG), and the SG44 assault rifle provided the German formations 
superior firepower.40  The committee’s key organizational recommendation was that the 
future squad organization be equipped with an American version of the German LMG.41   
However, it would take over a decade for this recommendation to happen.  Given the 
committee’s findings, the Infantry Conference recommended the nine-soldier infantry 
squad as shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. 1946 Infantry Conference Recommended Squad 
Organization.42 
Four years later, the nine-soldier squad organization developed by the 1946 Infantry 
Conference was put to the test in Korea. It was determined through combat experience that 
the nine-soldier squad was not optimal in the severely restricted mountainous terrain of 
Korea. This led General S.L.A. Marshall to modify the nine-soldier squad to a more combat 
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42 Adapted from Karcher, “Enhancing Combat Effectiveness, The Evolution Of The United States 
Army Infantry Rifle Squad Since The End Of World War II,” 26; Soldier image taken from Infantry 
Platoon and Squad, ATP 3–21.8 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2016), 1–13. 
20 
effective unit that fit the rugged terrain of Korea. General Marshall found that “a squad 
with two wings, each working under its own leader, but both working toward the same 
object, is demonstrably capable of stronger action and closer direction than eight men 
operating under one man.”43   General Marshall’s 11-soldier infantry squad would bring 
about the first two-fire team concept within the squad organization. General Marshall found 
that balancing each fire team with its own team leader and machinegun not only gave the 
squad more firepower but also more flexibility by enabling the squad to fire and 
maneuver.44 
F. 1956 RESEARCH STUDY OF INFANTRY RIFLE SQUAD TOE (ASIRS) 
Three years after the Korean War the Continental Army Command (CONARC) 
directed the Combat Operations Research Group (CORG) to conduct a study titled 
“Research Study of Infantry Rifle Squad TOE (ASIRS)” to determine the most combat-
effective squad organization.45   Unlike the 1946 Infantry Conference, which relied heavily 
on the previous combat experience of WWII veterans, this study instead conducted 
multiple field tests using a variety of different squad organizational structures and weapon 
load-outs. The purpose was to maximize the squad’s combat effectiveness by assessing a 
squad’s size, weapons load-out, and command structure. The ASIRS study analyzed the 
performance of eight different squad configurations during daylight attack and defense 
mission scenarios. The study tested each squad under the same conditions (i.e., terrain, 
mission, time, and standards) in order to help the researchers identify correlating factors.  
Additionally, the ASIRS study built on the data provided by three smaller studies 
previously conducted by the 18th Airborne Corp and the Third Infantry Division named 
Operation Falcon, Operation Follow Me, and Operation Sagebrush. Operation Falcon 
found that the 11-soldier squad could be controlled by one soldier and sustaining minimal 
                                                 
43 S.L.A. Marshall, Commentary on Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea: Winter of 
1950–51 (London: Green Hill Books, 1988), 54. 
44 Marshall, 53–56. 
45 Dean Havron, “A Research Study of the Infantry Rifle Squad TOE” (Fort Monroe, VA: 
Headquarters, Continental Army Command, 1956), 1. 
21 
casualties and still be capable of fighting.46   Operation Follow Me contributed to ASIRS 
by evaluating the effects of attrition on varying squad sizes and concluded that seven 
soldier squads were completely inadequate (due to attrition) and that the 10 soldier squad 
was optimal.47  Operation Sagebrush countered the 1946 Infantry Conference findings and 
concluded that the nine soldier squad was still too large for one soldier to control and too 
small to split in two. Instead, Sagebrush recommended a 12-soldier squad that included 
two balanced maneuver teams, two fire team leaders, and an assistant squad leader.48  
With these previous findings and additional field tests, the ASIRS study had three 
key conclusions. First, that the best leader-to-led ratio was actually between one-and-five 
and that the 11-soldier squad organization was optimal over the nine-man squad given the 
inclusion of two team leaders.49   Secondly, with the addition of two subordinate leaders, 
the squad leader was effectively able to distribute the burden of fire control down to the 
team level.50   Third, ASIRs found that by giving more than 1/3 of the squad a machine 
gun the effectiveness of the squad would actually begin to decrease due to excess weight 
and the lack of rifleman to assault the enemy.51   Therefore, like the Korean War 
configuration, ASIRS recommended the 11-soldier squad organization with two five-
soldier fire teams, each possessing a light machine gun and led by a team leader (see Figure 
4). 
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Figure 4. 1956 ASIRS Recommended Squad Organization.52 
G. 1961 THE OPTIMUM COMPOSITION OF THE RIFLE SQUAD AND 
PLATOON  
Five years after the ASIRS study CONARC again initiated a study to analyze the 
composition of the infantry squad to maximize its combat effectiveness using the 
equipment available between 1965–1970.53   In this study, the Army wanted to analyze the 
implications of new weapons technology introduced to the military at the time (i.e., the 
new M60 machine gun) and how they affected the squad organization. However, unlike 
the previous two studies “The Optimum Composition of the Rifle Squad and Platoon” 
(OCRSP) study used a more objective analysis approach that attempted to minimize biases 
and other subjective interpretations. To achieve this, the competing squad organizations 
were modified only in ways that needed to be analyzed using a two-sided field tactical 
exercise.54  Twenty-three officers and non-commissioned officers were then used as 
evaluators to conduct the field experiment and to ensure adherence to the designed 
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scenario. Each varying squad organization that was tested was subjected to the same 
obstacles. These obstacles included a pre-determined number of enemy combatants and 
casualty assessments in each iteration. One of the challenges in the study was identifying 
how to equip the squads with equipment believed to be used between 1965 -1970. To 
overcome this obstacle, the testers equipped the squads with equipment expected to be used 
in the future or items of approximately the same configuration.55   
Although this study used a slightly different framework, the results of the OCRSP 
study did not differ significantly from the 1956 ASIRS study. Similar to the ASIRS study, 
the OCRSP study also recommended the 11-soldier infantry squad organization stating that 
there was not a noticeable difference in the level of control between the 11-soldier squad 
and the nine-soldier squad.56  This study also validated the fire team concept as the best 
organization for control and flexibility in that it allowed the squad leader more options 
regarding which team would establish the base of fire or become the assault element. 
Regarding sustainability, the studies also produced similar findings noting that small 
squads cannot sustain casualties and retain the ability to fire and maneuver.57    Assessing 
the squad’s lethality, one unique change made in the squad’s composition was the 
replacement of the BAR with an organic M60 machine gunner and the replacement of one 
rifleman as an assistant gunner within each fire team organization (see Figure 5). 
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Figure 5. 1961 OCRSP Recommended Squad Organization.58 
H. 1970S INFANTRY RIFLE UNIT STUDY (IRUS) 
From 1961–1964 the army began to transition to the new Reorganization Objective 
Army Division (ROAD). In this transition, the Army reduced the size of the infantry rifle 
squad from 11 to 10 soldiers. This reduction was not the result of scientific research but 
instead was the Army’s way of trying to fill up its newly authorized infantry divisions 
under the ROAD transition program. It was also the result of the introduction of new 
weapon systems such as the M14 and M16 rifles (which many believed would mitigate the 
loss of a soldier from the squad given the increased rate of fire).59  
From 1966 to 1975, the Army conducted its most extensive field test to date titled 
“The Infantry Rifle Unit Study” (IRUS). The purpose of this study was once again to 
objectively determine the most effective infantry rifle squad organization. The IRUS study 
measured combat effectiveness using the following criteria: controllability, 
maneuverability, survivability, sustainability, intelligence and counterintelligence, and fire 
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effectiveness.60   To evaluate varying squad organizations objectively under these criteria, 
the testers once again developed a simulated force on force field environment that 
minimized variables by mirroring standards, missions, etc. However, unlike previous 
studies, the IRUS study leveraged new electronic sensor technology to help measure the 
effects of weapon systems and to help isolate key firepower variables being analyzed.61  
The multi-phased IRUS study arrived at to two key conclusions:  First, the study 
found that the 11-soldier infantry squad was the smallest squad configuration that could 
sustain normal attrition and continue to operate as a squad. Thus, the study recommended 
the 11-soldier squad over the other configurations.62  Secondly, the IRUS study determined 
that squads composed of 15-soldiers or above were too large to control and became less 
combat effective.63   Consequently, after the conclusion of the IRUS study, the Army once 
again changed from a 10-soldier configuration to an 11-soldier configuration (see Figure 
6).  This 11-soldier squad organization was nearly identical to the one recommended by 
the 1961 OCRSP study. 
                                                 
60 “Infantry Rifle Unit Study, IRUS-75, Phase II, Volume 1” (Ft. Benning, GA: United States Army 
Combat Developments Command, 1969), 7. 
61 “Infantry Rifle Unit Study, IRUS-75, Phase II, Volume 1,” 1–7. 
62 “Infantry Rifle Unit Study, IRUS-75, Phase II, Volume 1,” 53–54. 
63 “Infantry Rifle Unit Study, IRUS-75, Phase II, Volume 1,” 19,31. 
26 
 
Figure 6. 1967 IRUS Recommended Squad Organization.64 
I. 1984 ARMY OF EXCELLENCE 
In 1982, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) conducted 
an Army-wide study named “Army 86” to determine how to reshape the Army’s tactical 
and support organizations to the AirLand Battle doctrine and new weapons systems.65  The 
Army 86 study was significantly less objective than the IRUS study conducted a decade 
before. Unlike previous Army studies which used data from field tests and combat 
experience, the Army 86 study was driven primarily by two main top-down factors: First, 
the Army was reorganizing to become a rapidly deployable and light mobile force. In order 
to achieve this objective, the Army began to standardize unit formations across the force 
to better accommodate new equipment being fielded (i.e., the Bradley Fighting Vehicle) 
and also to become better logistically transportable via C-141Bs.66   Second, to create 
lighter divisions the Army generated personnel constraints by task which forced infantry 
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organizations to cut their size.67   These constraints ultimately resulted in the decrease of 
the infantry squad organization from the traditional 11 soldiers back down to nine 
soldiers.68   Then in 1983 at the Summer Army Commanders Conference, various Army 
leaders voiced their concern over the “hollowness” of the force, which had an imbalance 
in the combat-to-support structure.69   TRADOC addressed these concerns through the 
Army of Excellence (AoE) reorganization effort. However, like the Army 86, the AoE 
effort lacked objective analysis and was driven by personnel and budgetary constraints. 
Consequently, General William R. Richardson, the TRADOC Commander, affirmed the 
Army 86 nine-man infantry rifle squad, which is still in use to this day (see Figure 7).70  
 
Figure 7. Current Light Infantry Squad Configuration (AoE 
Recommended).71 
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J. CONTEMPORARY STUDIES 
1. 1990 MELODY 
Following five years of operating under the nine-soldier AoE squad configuration, 
Major Paul E. Melody, a student at the United States Army Command and General Staff 
College (CGSC) conducted a study of the infantry squad organization titled, “The Infantry 
Rifle Squad: Size is Not the Only Problem.”  Melody’s historical analysis found that the 
1946 Infantry Conference conclusions were still the optimal solution to maximizing the 
combat effectiveness of the contemporary squad organization.72    
Acknowledging the nine-soldier squad’s vulnerability to attrition and also the 
unlikelihood of the Army returning to the 11-soldier squad (due to downsizing), Melody 
concluded that the best solution to the problem would be to return the squad to a modified 
version of the 1946 Infantry Conference squad configuration (see Figure 8).73  To do this, 
Melody determined that the squad would need to do two things:  First, eliminate one M249 
squad automatic weapon and one grenade launcher. Doing this would free up more 
riflemen in the squad. Second, Melody believed that the two fire team structure within the 
squad should be eliminated and instead be reassigned an assistant squad leader to help with 
control. One key point in Melody’s conclusion is that the squad would not be capable of 
fire and maneuver, but instead only fire or maneuver.74   Thus, once again the infantry 
platoon would be the lowest echelon capable of fire and maneuver.    
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Figure 8. 1990 Major Paul E. Melody Recommended Squad 
Organization.75 
2. 1994 HUGHES 
Three years after the 1991 Gulf War, Major Stephen E. Hughes conducted a study 
in his work titled, “The Evolution of the U.S. Army Infantry Squad: Where Do We Go 
From Here? Determining the Optimal Infantry Squad Organization for the Future” to again 
analyze the most combat-effective infantry squad organization. In his study, Hughes 
conducted a comparative analysis between a three-team 10-soldier squad versus a two-
team nine-soldier squad configuration. Hughes’ combat effectiveness criteria included 
firepower, maneuver, leadership, protection, and resiliency.76   However, in his research, 
Hughes found another key variable to consider in designing the future squad organization. 
Hughes found that morale was also a significant variable that correlated to the infantry 
unit’s size. Hughes states, “Soldiers fight best when they are grouped with other soldiers 
they know and trust.”77   Hughes concludes that making an infantry unit too small will 
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create a negative impact on the combat effectiveness of the unit. This is the result of 
soldiers feeling alone, isolated, and afraid. These negative emotions degrade a unit’s ability 
to accomplish its mission. Therefore, Hughes concludes that the 10-soldier three-team 
squad organization is superior to the nine-soldier squad in the majority of the assessment 
criteria (see Figure 9).78      
 
Figure 9. 1994 Major Stephen E. Hughes Squad Organization.79 
3. 1998 RAINEY 
Building upon Hughes’ 1994 study, Major James E. Rainey conducted a study 
titled, “Sharpening the Tip of the Spear: Is the Light Infantry Squad the Right Size for the 
Future Battlefield?” in order to determine the inherent characteristics of a combat effective 
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squad organization.”80  To do this, Rainey first conducted a historical analysis of the 
evolution of the squad organization from the Revolutionary War to the 1984 AoE study. 
Rainey then conducted a comparative analysis of four different squad organizations that 
were most prevalent in past studies. The first configuration was the contemporary nine 
soldier, two-team squad. The second configuration was Hughes’ triple-team 10-soldier 
squad. The third configuration was the 11-soldier two-team squad and the final 
configuration was the 12-soldier squad that included two teams and an assistant squad 
leader. Rainey used four criteria to assess the combat effectiveness of each configuration: 
span of control, sustainability, flexibility, and leadership.81  
Rainey’s conclusions validated that the nine-soldier squad organization did not 
have sufficient sustainability given that only a small amount of attrition would deny the 
squad the ability to fire and maneuver. Rainey’s comparison chart showed that the 12-
soldier two-team squad was the most optimal configuration and that it provided the greatest 
sustainability and flexibility with a low leader-to-led ratio.82    
Rainey’s conclusions also echoed a common theme regarding the vulnerability of 
the current nine-soldier squad configuration in that it lacked the size to sustain casualties. 
Rainey concludes that “technology should be leveraged rather than used as a justification 
for a reduction in size”83   Therefore, the idea of downsizing the soldiers of an organization 
just because of an increase in the lethality of modern weapons systems may be a poor 
developmental method, given that adversaries will likely progress in lethality as well.  
Thus, Rainey recommended the 12-soldier squad organization illustrated in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10. 1998 Major James E. Rainey Squad Organization.84  
4. 2002 KARCHER 
In 1999 General Eric Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the United States Army began 
laying the groundwork for the new “Objective Force” which entailed the organization of 
small, agile, multi-functioning brigade combat teams. In 2002 Major Timothy M. Karcher 
conducted a study titled “Enhancing Combat Effectiveness, The Evolution Of The United 
States Army Infantry Rifle Squad Since The End Of World War II” in order to determine 
the optimum infantry squad size and composition of General Shinseki’s new Objective 
Force.85  Karcher’s analysis used the IRUS-75 combat effectiveness criteria (control, 
lethality, sustainability, and flexibility) to compare the current nine-soldier squad 
organization to the 11-soldier squad organization.   
Karcher analysis concluded four things. First, like many previous studies, Karcher 
found that the 11-soldier squad organization was far superior to the nine-soldier squad 
because it could “suffer 36 percent casualties prior to reorganizing into a single entity, as 
opposed to the nine-man squad that only required 22 percent casualties to require 
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reorganization.”86  Therefore, the 11-soldier squad was significantly better in sustainability 
than the smaller nine-soldier squad. Second, Karcher found that although the nine-soldier 
squad was easier to control than then 11-soldier squad, the advantage was nullified as soon 
as the team command structure broke down. Karcher notes that as soon as the nine-soldier 
squad sustains casualties it is forced to reorganize into a single entity.87  Third, regarding 
lethality and flexibility, Karcher found that the 11- soldier squad consistently outperformed 
the nine-soldier squad given the squad’s greater number of weapon systems and greater 
ability to fire and maneuver.88  
5. 2018 KAMARA 
Major Hassan Kamara, a member of the Army’s Future Studies Group and the 
Army’s Modernization Task Force, wrote a journal article in the 2018 Military Review 
titled, “Rethinking the U.S. Army Infantry Rifle Squad” in which he argues that “changes 
in war, military affairs, and human society since the 1940s, as well as projections about 
future war, sufficiently invalidate many of the foundational arguments, facts, and 
assumptions that generated the legacy nine-person infantry squad, and justify institutional 
reevaluation and reform.”89    
Kamara uses Sir Michael Howard’s dimensions of war (operational, technological, 
logistical, and social) to highlight how changes in military affairs and society have changed 
since the 1940s.90   Regarding the social dimension, Kamara argues that soldiers of today 
are significantly more familiar with warfare than the those conscripted during WWII due 
to the increase in the amount of simulated warfare experienced by civilians who participate 
in computer gaming, virtual reality, and paintball activities.91   Regarding the technological 
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dimension, Kamara refuted the 1946 conference’s claim that the emergence of more lethal 
weapons would enable smaller squad organizations because similar technology is 
proliferated among the enemy.92  Thus, both Rainey and Kamara refute the idea of 
downsizing the squad organization due to advancement in technology without objective 
analysis. 
Although Kamara does not provide exact organizational details, he recommends 
that the Army restore a modified version of the WWII infantry squad that includes a more 
robust scout reconnaissance team with an integrated drone, cyber, and electronic warfare 
capability. Kamara argues that this will improve the squad’s ability to survive “high 
attrition combat” and help it operate more dispersed in the contemporary battlefield.93  
K. CONCLUSION 
Analyzing the U.S. Army’s historical studies conducted from 1946 to the present 
we find various consistencies in the assessment criteria used and the conclusions drawn. 
Regarding the assessment criteria, in four of the five major studies, there are three key 
criteria consistently used in developing new squad organizations: control, attrition, and 
firepower (see Figure 11). Given the AoE’s lack of objective research, it did not consider 
these criteria.   
 
Figure 11. Historical Combat Effectiveness Assessment Criteria 
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Three of the four key studies found ‘control’ to be a key factor in determining the 
optimum squad organization of the future. First, regarding control, historical studies show 
that the optimum size of the infantry fire team is between three to five soldiers. The 1946 
Infantry Conference and the 1956 ASIRS studies both support this parameter. Under field 
conditions using voice and hand signals, any more than five soldiers will be difficult for 
one soldier to control. In contrast, any less than three soldiers in a team will begin to 
degrade the combat effectiveness of the team. Hughes’ 1994 study validates that not only 
will the team not be able to accomplish its task due to attrition but its combat effectiveness 
will also be degraded due to the negative effects of soldier’s morale. An individual soldier 
accompanied by others soldiers who can provide comfort and an assurance of survivability 
will help the soldier continue fighting.  
Second, these historical case studies claim that the optimum size of the infantry 
squad is somewhere between 11–15 soldiers. As the 1970s IRUS study found, any more 
than 15 soldiers would begin to degrade the combat effectiveness of the unit because it 
would be harder to control. Additionally, historical research does not conclusively argue 
whether the two-fire team squad organization is better than the three-fire team squad 
organization. Therefore, future research may consider evaluating the combat effectiveness 
of these two squad variations. 
Attrition (or sustainability or staying power) is another key assessment criterion 
used by four of the five key studies. These studies have proven that the ability to sustain 
casualties in combat (or through routine administrative actions) is critical for a squad’s 
survivability, lethality, and flexibility. With the exception to both the ROAD and AoE 
reorganizations that led to the decrease in the squad’s size, every other study recommended 
a more robust squad capable of sustaining up to a 25 percent loss in manpower. Although 
the 1946 Infantry Conference also recommended a decrease in the squad size from 12 to 
nine, at that time the squad was not doctrinally meant to fire and maneuver. Thus, as the 
lowest tactical unit, the 1946 squad could be considered a very large modern day fire team.   
The last key variable used by every study is ‘firepower’ or fire effectiveness. 
Squads must possess comparable or greater firepower than their enemies in order to be 
combat effective. These studies have shown that a squad’s firepower is an essential quality 
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because it increases the squad’s lethality or ability to suppress and destroy an enemy in 
close combat. This brief historical analysis has shown that a squad can possess many other 
characteristics but if the squad lacks lethality it cannot accomplish its core mission and thus 
becomes worthless. 
Based on these findings we can conclude that any future study should include these 
three critical factors. Additionally, we can also conclude that future squad reorganization 
should not be determined by monetary or personnel constraints within the Army (as was 
the case with the ROAD and AoE reorganizations). Rainey wisely concluded, “Arbitrary 
decision based on personnel and budget concerns should not be allowed to take the place 
of detailed studies, field testing, and combat analysis.”94  Thus, objective scientific 
variables should hold more weight in determining the most combat-effective squad 
organization of the future. 
These historical studies provide future research with key factors and developmental 
logic to consider in the creation of the new infantry squad organization. Following Jensen’s 
ideational framework (Threat  Analysis  Concept  Doctrine), the next step in this 
study is to analyze the future threat. In the next chapter, this study will look to the future 
operating environment to determine key factors to consider in the development of the future 
squad organizational concepts.    
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III. CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT 
The purpose of this chapter is to determine the characteristics of the future operating 
environment and its implications to the future infantry rifle squad organization. The chapter 
will first examine academic predictions of future warfare to understand the challenges 
associated with speculating too far into the future. Next, the chapter will analyze the 
contemporary operating environment by inspecting the significant capabilities of potential 
near-peer adversaries and then conclude by examining the terrain in which the future 
infantry rifle squads will most likely fight.  
A. THE FUTURE CONFLICT 
Many professional military thinkers and renowned academic writers have 
speculated what the future near-peer conflict will look like. Researchers have analyzed 
historical scenarios in which nations evolved to meet new threats. In 1986, Frank Barnaby 
published the book titled The Automated Battlefield, in which he conceptualizes a future 
battlefield almost entirely automated.95  Barnaby states, “The battle takes place with no 
human involvement. The soldiers used are robots. If there is human involvement, it is 
remote. Humans keep well away from the battlefield.”96 
In contrast to Barnaby, Jeremy Black argues in his book War and Technology, that 
technology is a key factor in affecting the results of conflict but that it is only one variable 
of many that determine the success or failure in combat.97   Black uses a qualitative 
methodology to examine military innovation in a historical context in order to forecast 
possible future battlefield environments. Black concludes that the effectiveness of 
technological innovations greatly depends on the actions of one’s opponents. Black’s 
research provides a good illustration of how challenging it is to forecast the future operating 
environment. 
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Similarly, Lawrence Freedman argues in his book The Future of War: A History, 
that most concepts and ideas developed by futurists in the past were wrong.   In his analysis, 
Freedman uses a qualitative approach using case studies beginning after the middle of the 
19th century to determine historical perspectives on what the future of warfare would look 
like. He then analyzes the difference between what actually happened and what was 
predicted to happen. Freedman notes that many previous concepts of future warfare were 
vastly over-exaggerated in lethality or effect.98   Thus, although future concepts are very 
influential, they are often wrong. Both Jeremy Black’s and Lawrence Freedman’s 
arguments support the claim that predicting the future operating environment can be 
challenging and quite often wrong. Given this logic, one can rationally argue that the best 
method for preparing the infantry squad for the next conflict is to focus less on the uncertain 
technologies of the far future and instead focus more on contemporary technology and 
tactics confronted today or in the near future.  
B. ENEMY 
Designing an infantry squad organization that can exploit the strengths and 
weaknesses of an adversary will significantly improve its survivability and lethality in 
future warfare. Therefore, this section will analyze America’s near-peer adversaries and 
highlight their modern capabilities. Field Manual (FM) 3–0 defines a peer threat as “an 
adversary or enemy with capabilities and capacity to oppose U.S. forces across multiple 
domains worldwide or in a specific region where they enjoy a position of relative 
advantage.”99   The two potential adversaries that meet these criteria are Russia and China. 
Therefore, this chapter will focus on the Russian and Chinese contemporary military 
capabilities that will most likely be encountered on the future battlefield.   
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The Russian military is a formidable force capable of creating multiple complex 
dilemmas for its adversary. A U.S. infantry squad confronting a Russian force is likely to 
encounter tanks, ground attack aircraft, drones (attack and reconnaissance), electronic 
attack assets, non-uniformed militias, information warfare effects, and most importantly 
long-range artillery. Given that many of these Russian threats are traditional systems (i.e., 
tanks, planes) the U.S. Army already has systems and capabilities to counter them. 
Although not organic, the Javelin and Stinger missile systems provide the infantry squad 
with a sufficient layer of protection when placed along the enemy’s most likely avenue of 
approach. Unlike the Ukrainians, which suffered from a lack of anti-tank-guided-missiles 
during their 2014 conflict with Russia, the U.S. military has the capability to confront these 
conventional Russian threats and thus will most likely not require significant 
reorganization in this area.100     
However, like many historical conflicts, artillery proved to be the most lethal 
weapon on the battlefield in Ukraine. In his personal account, Phillip A. Karber of the 
Potomac Foundation found that artillery accounted for over 85 percent of all losses in both 
the Russian and the Ukrainian militaries.101  Karber found that “the dramatic effect of these 
new munitions on the lethality of Russian indirect fire cannot be overemphasized. The 
combination of DPICM, scatterable mines, top-attack munitions and thermobaric warheads 
-- when used in pre-planned massed fire-strikes -- can have catastrophic consequences for 
targeted units.”102  Thus, according to Karber, Russian munitions proved very effective 
against light armor and infantry formations.103  Therefore, the greatest threat to the infantry 
rifle squad on the future battlefield is the enemy’s ability to find the infantry units through 
drone observation, snipers, scouts and electronic surveillance, and then engage these 
targets with artillery assets. In 2014 at a battle east of Mariupol, it only took the Russians 
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15 minutes after a drone flyover to attack a Ukrainian position resulting in the almost total 
destruction of two full infantry battalions.104   Like the Ukrainians, the current U.S. 
infantry squad does not have the means to effectively counter this type of drone-artillery 
combination attack. Thus, the future infantry squad must have the capability to counter 
these Russian tactics by either improved electronic concealment or by providing the 
infantry squad with its own electronic capabilities. These electronic capabilities must be 
capable of attacking or jamming enemy drones in order to deny them the ability to locate 
friendly positions or deny them the ability to communicate back to artillery support units. 
Over the last decade, the Russian military has made significant advances in its 
military capability. Since the invasion of Georgia in 2008, Russia has invested heavily in 
modernizing its Soviet-era equipment.105  One of Russia’s major areas of emphasis has 
been to improve its electronic warfare capability. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the 
U.S. ‘owned the night’ by investing heavily in night vision optics and night tactical 
training. This unique capability enabled the U.S. forces to achieve great battlefield success 
in Iraq and around the world. Similarly, it appears that Russia has made it their objective 
to ‘own the electromagnetic spectrum’ by investing heavily in new electronic jammers, 
radars, and other sensors. While the U.S. also possesses a robust electromagnetic 
capability, many analysts are concerned that the U.S. is lagging behind both Russia and 
China.106   In contrast, Russian air and ground forces continue to introduce new jammers 
and signals intelligence vehicles. The 2011 Global Security report notes that the Russians 
have integrated all their electronic warfare capabilities into a single system that combines 
signals intelligence, direction finding, intensive jamming, deception, and destructive fires 
systems.107  This capability enables Russia to destroy or disrupt their adversaries command 
and control network, weapon navigation, and timing systems. Russia also recognizes its 
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own vulnerable communication networks and continues to invest heavily in the protection 
of its own communication systems. At the 2017 International Defense Exhibition & 
Conference Russia revealed a new portable multimode radio in which they claim to be 
impervious to jamming or direction finding.108  Regardless of the validity of the Russian’s 
claims, it is important to recognize that the Russians are determined to dominate the 
electromagnetic spectrum by denying it to its adversary while protecting its own. 
The implications of the Russian electronic attack capability to the contemporary 
infantry rifle squad are significant. The current light infantry rifle squad does not possess 
the capability to counter this Russian electronic threat. In many cases, the lowest U.S. 
Army electronic warfare support teams reside at the brigade level or higher. Our near-peer 
adversaries can exploit this gap in capability. The U.S. military has become accustomed to 
a robust communications network that connects multiple enabling systems. According to 
the 2016 SITREP quarterly review “The single most important thing to note is that Russian 
electronic warfare forces have the capability to degrade or defeat U.S. Ground Force C4 
capabilities, including GPS/Position-Navigation and Timing (PNT) capabilities, and air 
defense and fires radars – all U.S. Army spectrum using emitters from fires control systems 
to SATCOM radios to cell phones are targeted and can be affected.”109   With a disrupted 
communications network, the current infantry squad will not be able to request medical 
support or fire support assistance in a safe and timely manner. Removing the infantry squad 
from these supporting enablers significantly decreases its survivability and lethality on the 
battlefield.   
Another vulnerability of the infantry squad is its electromagnetic signature. The 
average infantry soldier emits one or more electronic signals making themselves vulnerable 
to Russian observation and attack. These vulnerabilities include radios, GPS systems, 
watches, and even cell phones. On the battlefield of the future camouflage and face-paint 
will not be enough to conceal infantry squads from the enemy. These vulnerabilities will 
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force infantry soldiers to power off electronic devices and use them only when the benefits 
outweigh the risks. The dispersion of infantry squads will become more important but 
simultaneously more difficult assuming the degraded communications on future 
battlefields. These conditions will force squads to place more emphasis on understanding 
the commander’s intent. 
2. China 
Similar to Russia, China significantly reduced the size of its armed forces beginning 
in the 90’s in order to create a smaller, more technologically advanced and lethal force. A 
U.S. infantry squad confronting a Chinese enemy today would face many of the same 
threats as if it faced the Russian military. The battlefield would be proliferated with tanks, 
planes, helicopters, drones, and electronic warfare platforms. The infantry squad would 
confront the enemy in multiple domains. Like Russia, China also considers electronic 
warfare capabilities to be vital in future conflicts. According to the 2017 Department of 
Defense Annual Report to Congress, The Chinese military strategy focuses on attacking its 
enemy’s radio, radar, optical, infrared, computer and information systems.110   Like Russia, 
the Chinese military also has the capability to deny, degrade, and disrupt the infantry 
squad’s communication and navigation systems.   The implications to the U.S. infantry 
squad are nearly identical to the Russian threat.   
One unique difference between the Russian and Chinese threats is the Chinese level 
of combat experience. Some have labeled the Chinese Army’s lack of combat readiness as 
a “peace disease.”111   Some argue that many Chinese units lack the proper level of 
competence given their lack of combat over the last few decades. In contrast, the Russian 
units have garnered experience from the conflicts in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria. 
Therefore, although both the Russians and the Chinese possess similar capabilities, the 
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Russians will more likely employ their systems more effectively given their combat 
experience.  
Another unique difference between the Russian and Chinese threats is China’s 
cyber capabilities. Given that China produces 90 percent of the world’s printed circuit 
boards, China is in a unique position to exploit the infantry soldier through the cyber 
domain.112  China, as a global supplier of electronic components, is a more significant 
supply-chain cyber threat than Russia. In a 2018 report to the U.S. Armed Services 
Committee, The U.S. Government Accountability Office found that “until recently, DoD 
did not prioritize cybersecurity in weapon systems acquisitions. In part because DoD 
historically focused on the cybersecurity of its networks but not weapon systems 
themselves, DoD is in the early stage of trying to understand how to apply cybersecurity 
to weapon systems.”113  Although the infantryman does not possess the same magnitude 
of computer components as a jetfighter, the use of modern radios and tracking systems with 
adversary made components, still poses an exploitable risk.   
C. TERRAIN 
Terrain is a significant factor to consider when designing the next infantry squad 
organization. In 490 BC the densely packet Greek phalanx decimated the lighter more 
mobile Persian army while fighting at the battle of Marathon where the Greek organization 
and tactics proved much more effective in restricted terrain.114  Similarly, in 54 BC the 
more mobile mounted Parthian archers easily destroyed the densely packed Roman legions 
on the open plains of Mesopotamia.115  History has shown that successful militaries, which 
effectively leverage the terrain to their advantage (both tactical and organizational), can 
gain an upper hand over their adversaries. Therefore, in this new transition period, the U.S. 
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Army has an opportunity to optimize the current infantry squad organization to the 
battlefield of the future by leveraging the effects of terrain to its advantage. Thus, 
understanding the characteristics of the terrain of the future battlefield is critical to 
achieving this success.  
According to the 2018 United Nations (UN) World Urbanization Prospects, 55 
percent of the world’s population lives in an urban environment.116   This number 
continues to grow as the world population increases over time. The UN report projects that 
the number of megacities (cities with over 10 million inhabitants) will increase by 23 
percent by 2050.117   Given this data, there is a very high probability that the future infantry 
squad organization will have to operate in this complex urban environment. General Milley 
states, “If war is politics by other means, and politics is all about people and power, then 
future wars are almost certainly going to be fought mostly in cities, which has significant 
implications for the military.”118  Therefore, to maximize combat effectiveness, the future 
infantry squad organization should consider these urban characteristics.  
Military doctrine characterizes urban combat as an attrition-style combat, which 
inflicts a large toll on manpower and resources. Analyzing the 2013 U.S. Joint Urban 
Operations 3–06 we find two key characteristics of urban combat impactful to the infantry 
squad: First, urban operations are more manpower intensive.119  Urban environments favor 
larger squads over smaller squads given that larger squads can share a greater workload, 
sustain more casualties, and provide a greater level of mental security. Snipers, booby-
traps, and other threats have a significant impact on the psychological and physical makeup 
of the infantry squad.120   The urban terrain offers an adversary more angles of attack 
resulting in an increased friendly casualty rate over other types of terrain. Given these 
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conditions, small squad organizations are often unable to observe every possible angle of 
enemy attack within their platoon assigned sector. Urban terrain is also manpower intensive 
because medical and logistical support assets (air and ground) are often unable to get to the 
infantry squads deep inside the city due to tall structures or building rubble. This terrain 
forces infantry soldiers to carry casualties and supplies to viable extraction points further 
than in other types of terrain. Therefore, an infantry squad organization operating in an 
urban battlefield will have a greater need for soldiers than in any other terrain.   
Second, urban environments inhibit the use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Joint 
Publication 3–06 states, “Terrain in urban environments can impede a land force’s ability 
to send and receive data directly to satellites. This can impact global positioning system 
receivers and inhibit their ability to provide accurate data.”121   Massive skyscrapers and 
the thousands of civilian electromagnetic emissions throughout a city will negatively affect 
the infantry squad’s communication architecture and global positioning navigation 
systems. These systems are vital for command and control and munition accuracy. In cities, 
the effects of the thick re-enforced buildings and restrictive rules of engagement tend to 
blunt the effects of fire support systems.122  The degraded ability to communicate via radio 
frequency will force squads to return to the traditional visual and voice commands for 
squad control. This will degrade a squad’s ability to effectively disperse and mass when 
needed. The urban structures will also degrade the ability of satellite-guided munitions to 
hit their intended targets potentially resulting in increased collateral damage. An infantry 
squad’s ability to communicate with supporting armor, artillery, and air support assets are 
vital to its lethality and survivability on the battlefield. The infantry squad organization 
must evolve technologically and organizationally to better confront these future urban 
threats. A 2017 RAND study highlighted the opportunity that exists to exploit the 
electromagnetic spectrum in an urban environment: 
The Battle of Sadr City shows that there are also significant opportunities 
to exploit electromagnetic operations to find and kill or capture adversaries. 
Nevertheless, U.S. forces have not operated in an urban environment where 
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the adversary can exploit or disrupt communications since World War II. 
This may not be the case in the future, even against non-state adversaries.123 
Therefore, not only will the future infantry squad be challenged by near-peer 
electromagnetic warfare equipment but the terrain itself will pose a significant challenge 
to a squad’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Future squad organization should thus 
incorporate the capability to leverage the electromagnetic spectrum to its favor in order to 
improve its lethality and survivability in future combat.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Given the uncertainties of the mid-term and long-term future, the contemporary 
operating environment provides a greater prediction for the near-future battlefield. In the 
future near-pear conflict the infantry rifle squad is likely to be confronted by conventional 
threats it has not encountered in over four decades. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict has 
proven that the era of tank warfare has not ended. Infantry squads supported by Javelin 
teams and Stinger teams must be capable of destroying modern enemy tanks, planes, and 
helicopters.   On the future battlefield, long-range artillery will continue to be the “king of 
battle” through its devastating effects on light units. Trenches and foxholes will again be 
vital to protecting infantry soldiers from the dangers of long-range artillery fire. More 
importantly, it will be critical for the infantry rifle squad to possess the capability to deny 
the enemy sensors (aerial drone or ground sensor) the ability to communicate targets to the 
supporting enemy artillery systems. The current infantry squad organization is blind to the 
electromagnetic spectrum. The current dismounted infantry rifle squad does not possess 
the electronic support capability to map out the electromagnetic environment for greater 
situational awareness on the battlefield. The future infantry squad organization must 
include the ability to observe and affect the electromagnetic spectrum in order to leverage 
it to its advantage. Thus, providing electronic warfare capacities down to the squad level 
in the future operating environment will significantly improve the infantry squad’s lethality 
and survivability on the battlefield. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Future U.S. Army research should re-analyze the current infantry rifle squad 
organization to maximize its combat effectiveness to the future operating environment. 
Synthesizing the U.S. Army studies from 1946 to the present we can extrapolate two key 
factors for future research to consider:  First, future research should optimize the infantry 
squad organization using primarily objective analysis from controlled field tests or combat 
experience as the main drivers of organizational change. Second, top-down constraints 
such as personnel-manning, vehicle design capacity, or other limiting variables should not 
be the driving factors for determining future squad modifications. The Army-86 and AoE 
infantry studies were subject to these top down constraints and resulted in less effective 
infantry squad organizations that proved to be vulnerable to the effects of attrition.124    
A. SUSTAINABILITY 
This historical analysis has shown that size is a key factor in optimizing the combat 
effectiveness of an infantry rifle squad organization. An infantry squad’s size directly 
correlates to the variables of control and sustainability. As the size of an infantry squad 
grows it becomes more capable of mitigating the negative effects of attrition; however, the 
squad simultaneously becoming more and more difficult to control. Inversely, the smaller 
the squad organization becomes, the easier it is to control, but the less it is able to 
effectively fire and maneuver.   
Given the high probability of the infantry rifle squad operating in dense urban 
environments, which require more manpower and result in a greater amount of casualties, 
it is imperative that the U.S. Army avoids the next near-peer conflict with the current nine 
soldier organization. Historical research has shown that the current nine-soldier infantry 
rifle squad is vulnerable to the effects of attrition.125   Therefore, future research should 
study how to grow the organization to better mitigate these vulnerabilities.   
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B. LETHALITY 
Historical studies have shown lethality to be a key factor in determining the combat 
effectiveness of infantry squad organizations. Infantry rifle squads must possess equal or 
greater firepower (rate of fire + destructive power) than the near-peer adversary to achieve 
suppression effects. The current organic weapons load-out of the infantry rifle squad, 
which includes the squad automatic weapon (M249) and multi-use weapon (M320), 
provide the squad with sufficient firepower to both suppress and maneuver against a lightly 
armed near-peer adversary. However, in the future near-peer operating environment with 
modern tanks and planes it will be imperative that company Javelin and Stinger missile 
systems provide integrated support to the infantry rifle squad to effectively counter the 
near-peer air and armor threats. Without these integrated weapon systems, the infantry 
squad organization would be vulnerable and fall into the same dilemma in which the 
Ukrainians found themselves against the Russians in 2014.   
Next, future research needs to study how to improve the infantry rifle squad’s 
lethality by giving it a more robust electromagnetic capability that is organic to the squad. 
Given the robust electromagnetic and drone capabilities of the current near-peer 
adversaries, the current infantry rifle squad organization is lacking in its potential lethality 
and survivability. Equipping the current infantry rifle squad with lightweight man-portable 
electronic warfare systems significantly increases its lethality and survivability against a 
near-peer adversary. These electromagnetic systems would allow the dismounted infantry 
squad the capability to jam enemy radio frequencies, disrupt enemy drone navigation and 
communication systems, geo-locate enemy signals, electronic deception, and map out the 
electromagnetic spectrum for better situational awareness and actionable intelligence. One 
method may be to integrate electronic receivers and transmitters already existing on the 
typical infantry soldiers (i.e., squad radio and GPS) into a single system.   
Although the U.S. Army is currently researching how best to organize and equip 
the future force with greater electromagnetic capabilities using new prototype systems, 
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there is currently no long term solution at the lower tactical levels.126  Adding this 
capability at the tactical infantry squad level will likely require adding one or more trained 
electronic warfare specialists given the complexity of the electromagnetic spectrum and 
the extra weight of the equipment. Thus, although the technology needed to equip the 
dismounted infantry squad with this capability already exists (i.e. DRS Phoenix system) 
more research must be conducted to determine the optimal organizational structure that 
includes these types of manned systems.127    
Both armed and unarmed enemy drones will pose a significant threat in the near-
future operating environment.128   Whether drones are used as an observation platform to 
call in an artillery strike or as an attacking swarm, electromagnetic disruptive technologies 
provide the infantry rifle squad a greater level of defense on the future battlefield.129   Thus, 
future Army studies should research how to feasibly re-organize the infantry rifle squad to 
include these critical drone defense capabilities in order to increase its lethality and 
survivability.   
C. CONTROL 
In the future operating environment, the infantry squad leader’s ability to control 
the squad will be disrupted not only by enemy electronic attack but also by the 
environmental factors relating to the urban environment. Large heavy building structures, 
enemy jamming systems, GPS spoofing capabilities, and an environment proliferated with 
competing civilian radio frequencies will disrupt the squad’s ability communicate and 
navigate on the future battlefield. These factors will significantly degrade the squad’s 
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ability of control. ASIRs 1-to-5 leader-to-led ratio is a key parameter that future infantry 
squad designs should continue to consider.   
In the future environment, the infantry squad cannot solely rely on modern 
command and control systems. In this communication contested environment, the time 
proven techniques of hand-and-arm signals, voice communication, signal flares, markers, 
and other non-electronic movement control measures will prove invaluable to the 
infantryman’s ability to control. Until a radio system is designed that can provide safe and 
secure communications in this type of operating environment infantry squads will often 
have to rely on these older time-proven techniques. However, although these time-proven 
techniques are impervious to electronic attack they are limited in range. Future squad 
organizations must consider these limiting factors. As the enemy will not be capable of 
jamming all communications everywhere at once, they will likely prioritize the use of their 
electronic attack assets along key avenues of attack or the defense of key terrain. Therefore, 
infantry organizations must be capable of operating effectively in both contested and non-
contested electronic environments. Infantry concepts, which dictate small-dispersed squads 
over wide areas, must consider the challenges of controlling such a formation when 
communications are being jammed or disrupted on a routine basis.   
D. FLEXIBILITY 
Regarding flexibility, future infantry rifle squad organization designs should 
consider the following factors:  First, as confirmed by the 1961 OCRSP study, infantry rifle 
squads should include balanced fire teams in which each team includes the same 
organizational equipment. Balanced fire teams provide the squad leader with greater 
tactical flexibility. If one fire team becomes pinned down, the squad leader can use the free 
fire team (or teams, depending on the squad configuration) to maneuver or suppress the 
enemy as is best in the given situation. The balanced fire team organization also allows the 
squad leader to better balance squad security tasks (such as taking point during tactical 
movements, etc.).   
Given the limited amount of resources, the squad cannot possess every capability. 
However, future research should consider reviewing the rifle squad’s organic 
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organizational equipment in order to design a more flexible infantry organization. The 
more an infantry rifle squad is able to operate independently, the better it will be on the 
future battlefield. This can be achieved by providing each fire team with electronic attack 
and support capabilities. An infantry squad that possesses the ability to jam enemy drones 
without having to request support from a brigade electronic warfare team is more lethal 
and survivable. Additionally, in a communication-degraded environment, infantry squads 
will be limited in their ability to coordinate for indirect fire, air defense, anti-tank, and other 
supporting enablers. Thus balancing each infantry squad’s fire teams with critical enabling 
capabilities (i.e., electronic attack, defense, & support) will increase its overall flexibility 
but also its lethality and survivability on the future battlefield. 
E. LARGER IMPLICATIONS 
Following the conclusion of major combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 
U.S. military has entered a unique transition period. Once again, the U.S. military is 
looking forward to the future operating environment to better prepare itself for what is to 
come. To retain a lethal and survivable force the U.S. Army must evolve its organization 
and tactics as determined by threat and environmental factors. The infantry rifle squad, as 
the basic building block of platoons/companies/battalions, is the key area of focus from 
which future research should focus.   
On the future battlefield with an opposing near-peer adversary, the infantry rifle 
squad will confront numerous threats across every domain. The infantry squad must be 
capable of defeating conventional threats it has not had to face in over four decades. 
However, unlike previous conflicts, the future near-peer enemy will significantly leverage 
new innovative tactics and technologies to include drones and electromagnetic platforms. 
General Raymond A. Thomas, the head of United States Special Operations Command 
stated, “Right now in Syria, we’re in the most aggressive E.W. environment on the planet 
from our adversaries…they’re testing us every day.”130   The current infantry squad does 
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not possess the capabilities needed to effectively operate in the electromagnetic spectrum. 
Given the lack of electromagnetic capabilities, the current infantry squad is vulnerable to 
enemy observation and attack. Therefore, future research should apply historical lessons 
learned and logic from previous Army studies as well as modern conflicts to determine the 
optimal infantry squad organization of the future.   
Thus, as validated by Stephen Rosen and many others, militaries are not doomed to 
fight the next war as they did the last. By understanding the future operating environment 
and developing new innovative infantry rifle squad concepts that leverage this new 
environment, the U.S. military can once again gain an advantage. Although there is 
currently a wide range of future concepts regarding the future of warfare, almost every 
concept continues to emphasize the need of the infantryman. Regardless of the level of 
artificial intelligence and other technological advancements, the infantryman will continue 
to play a vital role in future combat. T.R. Fehrenbach wisely states, “You may fly over a 
land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life—but if you 
desire to defend it, protect it and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, 
the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men in the mud.”131   Even in this 
atomic age, in which the push of a button could destroy civilization, Fehrenbach’s 
statement has proved true. Regardless of the technological level of innovation, the 
infantryman’s role in future conflict will be important. The survival of our great nation 
depends upon our ability to train, equip, and prepare our future infantrymen to confront our 
forthcoming near-peer enemies. 
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